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Kievan Rus which was founded in 880 was made up of a
loose knit alliance between small city states in what is
today western Russia. The most powerful of these city
states was Kiev. During the early thirteenth century the
Mongol continued their march west until they conquered
Kievan Rus in 1240. Although the Mongol did not occupy the
Russian lands, the Kievan Rus period era was effectively
over. The turmoil that followed the Mongol invasion allowed
for Moscow, a previously weak and minor principality to
rise out of the shadows and become a major political
player. The goal of this paper is to examine how Moscow
rose to power; this will be done by following the evolution
of the Moscow princess attitudes towards their authority
and right to rule, between the years 1325 until 1584.
To understand process of centralization in Moscow,
several interpretations have arisen. Several historians
have examined the Mongols contributions to the Muscovite
state, while others’ interpretations viewed the Muscovites
as rising to power in spite of the Mongols.
In recent years much scholarship has been directed
towards the question of how the Mongols influenced the rise
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of the Muscovite state. There has been three basic
interpretation of the rise of Moscow. They are: complete
denial of Mongol influence, recognition of Mongol
influence, but gave the influence negative attributes, and
attributed the rise of Moscow to the Mongol influence.
The first historians to interpret the Russian history
during the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth century
moved the political domination of the Mongols over the
Kievan Rus principalities into obscurity. Unfortunately
this view lasted well into the twenty first century. As
Nicholas V. Riasanovsky states, when examining Mongol rule
over Kievan Rus historians have two avenues of
interpretation: “the first denied all long range
significance to the Mongol conquest of Russia, the second
considered it lastingly important in terms of its
destruction, burden, and pressure”.1 This unfortunate
interpretation ran rampant throughout historians’ works. As
Valentine Tschebotarioff-Bill states the second phase of
Russian development happened in spite of the Mongol
oppression.2 Charles Halperin further expands, and gives a
reason why the Mongols contribution to the people of Kievan
Rus was overlooked. The Russian political, social, and
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moral level was so superior to the Mongols, that borrowing
from them was unthinkable.3
The second type of interpretation can be seen in the
historian Michael Cherniavsky’s, 1959 work, “Khan or
Basileus: An Aspect of Russian Mediaeval Political Theory.”
Cherniavsky sees the Mongol invasion and occupation of
Russia as an interruption of Russian history.4 The focuses
of his article is on how the Mongol occupation of Russia
changed “Russia’s image of her ruler”.5 He proposes that the
image of the Mongol Khan replaced the Byzantine emperor as
their image of power. The way that Cherniavsky frames his
article, cast the Mongols in a negative light. Cherniavsky
states that he is going to “deal with only one aspect of
the general problem of the Mongol Yoke and the changes in
Russian society and life induced by it”.6
Cherniavsky used a letter from Emperor John
Cantacuzene to Grand Prince Simeon the Proud,7 service
books, Sophia chronicle, Nikon chronicle, trinity
chronicle, and diplomatic correspondence. Cherniavsky chose
these sources because they either dealt with direct
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interaction between the Mongols and the Russian, or
addressed how the Russians worshiped the Tsar. The question
that Cherniavsky asked form the sources he used was: how
did the Russians perceive the power of the Tsar?
Cherniavsky’s interpretation of the rise of the
Muscovites does recognize that there was influence from
both the Khan and the Basileus8. However Cherniavsky
believes that the Basilues’ influence resulted in positive
qualities of future Tsar, and that Khan’s influence
resulted in negative qualities. Cherniavsky use Ivan IV to
exemplify the contrasting influences. He says that Ivan IV
(from the Khan) Killed by day (from the Basilues) and
prayed by night.9
Fortunately this interpretation of the Mongol conquest
of Kievan Rus started to slowly erode during the 1960’s.
This changing interpretation can be seen in the works of
historians Edward Louis Keenan, and Karl Wittfogel. They
acknowledge that the people of Kievan Rus and Muscovy did
borrow some institution from the Mongols, but do not deem
this borrowing as a positive result for the Muscovites.
Karl A. Wittfogel’s article “Russia And The East: A
Comparison And Contrast” was published in 1963. He
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addresses the question, how did the Princes of Moscow come
to build an autocratic state. He believes that it is based
on an Asiatic model borrowed form the Mongols. Wittfogel
uses the Hydraulic approach, which was first used by Karl
Marx, to explain how the building of dams, levees, and
dikes impacted Asiatic societies.10 As this indicates
Wittfogel presents his paper in a Marxist light.11

He

stresses the importance of class stratification in Russian
and Oriental societies.12 Wittfogel also deems that the
previous empirical methods used by historians do not fully
comprehend the patterns of the “Orientalized” state and
society.13 He refers to these patterns to justify his
reliance on Marxist theory.
Wittfogel uses the Nikon Chronicle, diplomatic
correspondence, and the writings of Staden, who served
under Ivan the IV as his primary sources. He asked three
basic questions from the primary sources. How did the
Mongol political institutions work, how did the Mongols
govern the lands of Kievan Rus, and what was the
interaction between the Russians and Mongol?
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Wittfogel article is meant to criticize the views of a
fellow historian named Vasily Kliuchevsky. Kliuchevsky “did
not equate the Muscovite and Oriental despotism, although
he recognized important similarities between them.”14 To
build up his argument, that Oriental despotism did happen
in Russia, Wittfogel borrows ideas and interpretation from
other historians to help substantiate his claim.15
Edward Louis Keenan wrote his article “Muscovy and
Kazan: Some Introductory Remarks on the Patterns of Steppe
Diplomacy” in 1967. As the title implies, Keenan focuses
the majority of his writing on the patterns of steppe
diplomacy. He uses patterns to help reevaluate the primary
sources.16 Keenan takes a very scientific approach to his
work. He states: “we are so far from adequate understanding
of many of these subjects that we cannot be squeamish about
borrowing any applicable method from the faster-moving
sciences.”17 Keenan’s article is based on cross-referencing
sources to build new historical data, which is quite
different from what the other historian being examined did
in their work. This made the questions that they asked of
the sources very different.
14
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Keenan is primarily trying to expand the knowledge of
the diplomatic relations between the different states that
occupied the steppe during the turbulent Middle Ages. He is
saying that the previous historians did not have access to
the knowledge of the sources, because his “pattern” work
has revealed distinctly new insight into the working of the
diplomatic relations of the various states on the steppe.
Keenan believes that the Muscovite state was able to gain
dominance over the other principalities, because it did not
challenge the steppe societies.18 He makes the distinction
that there was no need for Moscow to challenge the Mongols,
because its goals were the opposite of the Mongols, the
resulting autonomy allowed for Moscow’s growth.19
In the 1980’s and 1990’s the full recognition of the
Mongol influence in Muscovy was acknowledged: by the likes
of Halperin, David Morgan, and Donald Ostrowski. Halperin
looked at the political history of the Golden Horde’s rule
over Russia, and then examined how these political
institutions of the Golden Horde had impacted the lives of
the Russians citizens and princes. Halperin goes beyond
just looking at how the Mongols influenced the Muscovites;
he also explains why the Mongols were only viewed as
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destructive by the medieval chroniclers. He labels his
explanation “the ideology of silence.” Halperin outlines
how the ideology of silence has affected the recording of
the history of Kievan Rus during the Mongol Yoke, and the
first few interpretations of the Mongol Yoke by medieval
historians.
Halperin reinterprets the rise of Moscow by arguing
that the Muscovite princes worked within the Mongol
political system to help propel themselves to the top of
Russian politics. The Muscovite princes used the Mongol tax
system to help strengthen their position in Russia by
exempting themselves from taxes and making the difference
up by raising taxes on the rest of the population20. This
method allowed them to increase their wealth and power, but
avoid confrontation with the Khan. The Moscow Princes
allied itself with the Golden Horde during the first half
of the fourteenth century,, which encouraged the Mongols to
direct raids against Moscow’s enemies21. Once again this
critical aspect of Muscovy and Mongol relationship is often
left out of many chronicles and the first monographs
written about the Mongols conquest of Kievan Rus. To
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suggest that Moscow collaborated with the Mongols was
unthinkable.
Halperin also states that the destructive power of the
Mongols encouraged migration to Moscow because it was
considered a safe place. Due to its alliance with the
Golden Horde, many people went to Moscow22. During medieval
times manpower was perhaps the greatest asset a
principality could have, and the influx of population
greatly strengthened Moscow. The Moscow princes were able
to ally with the Golden Horde when it was strong and
challenged the Horde when it weak, giving them great
success in their attempt to gain greater autonomy and
dominate the other Russian city-state.
David Morgan places more emphasis on the Mongols from
the time Chingis Khan united the tribes in 1206 until the
death of the last Yuan emperor in China in 1370. This focus
on the Mongols themselves provides a very unique analysis.
Morgan provided an explanation of how the Mongols developed
their complex administration system by borrowing ideas from
the Chinese and from the Arabs, then combining them to make
them their own.
Morgan’s sources are very elaborate, using Kievan Rus
chronicles, firsthand accounts, recorded folklore, Chinese
22
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court records, and Arabian records. His amount and type of
sources used differed from the other historians, because he
focused on all four kingdoms of the Khans and not just the
Golden Horde. In particular his chapter on the “Nature and
Institutions of the Mongol Empire” was incredibly helpful
in understanding how the Mongols operated.23
Ostrowski methodology is not much different that the
other historians, but he does not recognize his work as the
truth. He understands that there is no way to be completely
certain about the past. As he states, the sources from the
thirteenth and fourteenth century are meager at best,24 and
“much of what I am arguing, therefore, is based on
inference, deduction, and a degree of speculation.”25 This
is a direct consequence of the Postmodern criticism of
historical study, that the past is unknowable. Therefore
Ostrowski is not claiming to be providing a concrete
analysis of the past, but instead he acknowledges the
problem facing historians26 and presents an argument that is
to the best of his ability.
The primary sources that Ostrowski relied on were
diplomatic correspondence and administrative records.
23
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Ostrowski chose these sources, because he was writing a
political history. The questions that Ostrowski asked of
the primary sources are very prudent to his topic. He asks
the same question from both the Muscovite and the Mongol
sources: what type of political institutions did they use?
He then takes this information and cross-references it to
draw similarities between the two.
Even though many gains have been made toward
understanding the full impact that the Mongol rule had on
the rise of the Muscovy state, it can hardly be called
complete. Historians have said little about how the Khan’s
absolute power changed and shaped the Moscow princes’ view
of power. The Mongols sent the Muscovites on their way to
developing a true autocracy.
When the Mongol conquered Kievan Rus, they brought
many new and foreign ideas and customs with them, possibly
the most important was the idea of complete and absolute
power. The Khans had complete power over their people; they
were supreme and unchallenged rulers. This type of
leadership was superior to the local power base of Kievan
Rus. The Khan was able to force the Princes and Boyars to
travel great distances to pay him tribute. Not only did
they pay him tribute, they were forced to bow to the
Mongols idols and to the Khan. This meant that they
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completely submitted themselves to the Kahn, even at the
expense of renouncing their Christian Faith.
This policy of the Mongols which required complete
submission form the princes, created a new idea of absolute
power for the people of Kievan Rus and Moscow in
particular. This was not the only contribution that led the
city of Moscow to gain prominence over the other cities of
Kievan Rus, but the idea of absolute power was the
foundation that the Muscovites needed to build their
autocracy.
The fragmented political structure that existed in
Kievan Rus and in Moscow can be seen in the early
testaments of the Grand Princes of Moscow. These testaments
were written by the Grand Princes and acted as will. To
observe the evolution of the Moscow princes’ perceived
notion of power, this paper will examine the testaments
from Ivan Kalita, Ivan III, and Ivan IV. The will of these
leaders demonstrates the development of absolute power.
Ivan Kalita wrote his testament in 1339, Ivan III in
1503, and Ivan IV’s in 1572. I chose Kalita’s testament
because it indicates how the grand princes traditionally
viewed power. Ivan III’s testament illustrates a
significant change in how he viewed his role as grand
prince. Ivan IV’s testament is the final culmination of the
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grand princes changing view of power. These testaments give
an insight into how power was divided among the princes and
how they viewed their role as Grand Prince.
Ivan Kalita’s was grand prince of Moscow from 1328
until 134127. He ruled during a period of transition for
Muscoy. Under Kalita Moscow began to become a more
prominent state. As his testament demonstrates the Moscow
still suffered from a fragmented political structure. Ivan
Kalita does not specify an heir to his throne. He divides
his land holdings and titles between his three sons Seman,
Ivan, and Andrey.28 This creates three Moscow princes that
all have a legitimate claim to the throne. Kalita also
divided up the city revenues between his three sons and his
princess.29 His princess got the revenue from Osmnicheye,
while his sons shared revenue from all the other cities.30
Perhaps the most important resource in medieval time was
man power. Kalita also dictated that his three sons would
equally manage the enrolled people.
Ivan Kalita partitioned his titles, land holding, and
resources equally to his three sons. This created a
problem. The resources of Moscow are not being used in a
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unified manner. Tax revenue and military power is going in
three different directions. The fragmentation of this
political system leads to a weak state, which in turn
hampers the ambitions of the grand princes and the growth
of Moscow.
Ivan III was grand prince of Moscow from 1462 until
1506.31 By the end of his reign, the Mongols no longer had
control over the Russian lands.32 This allowed for him to
start a rapid centralization of power in Moscow. Ivan III
will demonstrates several changes in the idea of power held
by the Muscovite princes. In the second paragraph of his
will Ivan III specifies that his younger sons should obey
their older brother, Vasiliy in all things.33 This statement
by Ivan III creates a strict hierarchal system where the
oldest son is the undisputed ruler, unlike Ivan Kalita,
where his three sons where treated as near equals.
Ivan III clearly states that Vasiliy gets all of Ivan
III’s grand principalities.34 This means that Vasiliy is
granted all of the tax rights and the right to rule over
the enrolled people.35 This is in stark difference to what
Ivan Kalita left in his will. Kalita divided the taxes and
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the rule of the enrolled people evenly between his three
sons.
Vasiliy was given the right to exclusively coin money,
and administrate justice.36 These stipulations give Vasiliy
complete control over the finances and the court system.
Vasiliy’s control over such important systems cements his
role as the complete and dominate ruler.
Ivan III was also the first grand prince to justify
his rule with divinity. He stated that God had given him
his Principalities.37 This justifies his and future grand
princes absolute rule over the boyars and people.
Ivan III’s decision to leave all of his power to his
eldest son had important repercussion. It effectively
created a stable line of secession, which in turn allowed
for the grand princes to focus all the resources of Moscow
in one direction, allowing them to expand their sphere of
influence.
Ivan IV took the throne in 1547 and died on 1584.38 His
will shows the final progression of the changing ideals of
power, when he blesses his Son Ivan I with the entire
Russian Tsardom.39 This shows that the Muscovite grand
princes now view themselves as the ruler of all of Russian.
36
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The term Tsar had traditionally been reserved for the
Mongol Khan or the Emperor of Constantinople. The Muscovite
princes now viewed themselves as all powerful much like the
Khan and Emperor did.
Many historians have commented on how Moscow princes’
created a centralized state, but few have mention why the
princes’ created a centralized state. I believe that the
princes’ idea of power evolved due to influence from the
Khan’s absolute power.
The testaments of Ivan Kalita, Ivan III, and Ivan IV
show a clear change in the way that the Muscovite princes
viewed the idea of power. Not surprisingly, the growth of
Moscow paralleled the grand princes changing idea of power.
Kalita left eight cities and principalities to his three
sons. Ivan III left eighty seven cities and principalities,
and Ivan IV left one hundred sixty two cities and
principalities.
The rise of Muscovy consisted of a complex and
complicated system of events. However it is clear that the
changing ideas of power of the grand princes had an
important function in the growth of Moscow. Ivan IV ruled
over a centralized and autocratic state that allowed him to
spread his dominion over all the Russian lands.
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